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Abstract
In many tournaments investments are made over time and conducting a review only
once at the end, or also at points midway through, is a strategic decision of the tournament
designer. If the latter is chosen, then a rule according to which the results of the different
reviews are aggregated into a ranking must also be determined. This paper takes a first step
in the direction of answering how such rules are optimally designed.
A characterization of the optimal aggregation rule is provided for a two-agent two-stage
tournament. In particular, we show that treating the two reviews symmetrically may result
in an equilibrium effort level that is inferior to the one in which only a final review is con-
ducted. However, treating the two reviews lexicographically by first looking at the final
review, and then using the midterm review only as a tie-breaking rule, strictly dominates
the option of conducting a final review only. The optimal mechanism falls somewhere in
between these two extreme mechanisms. It is shown that the more effective the first-stage
effort is in determining the final review’s outcome, the smaller is the weight that should be
assigned to the midterm review in determining the agents’ ranking.
∗We wish to thank Maya Eden, Eyal Winter and Paul Schweinzer for helpful conversations. Motty Perry
gratefully acknowledges financial support from the ISF 032-1548.
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1 Introduction
Lazear and Rosen (1981) were the first to notice that in many circumstances it is optimal to
set up compensation on the basis of rank order, and that certain puzzling features of markets
are easily explained in these terms. The vast economic literature that followed adopted their
model in assuming that tournaments are like ”all-pay auctions” in which agents choose their
effort levels simultaneously at the start, and then prizes are allocated according to the result-
ing ranking. A very partial list includes the papers of Green and Stokey (1983), Dixit (1987),
Krishna and Morgan (1998), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001), to
name just a few. In many tournaments however, investments are made over time and whether
to conduct a review only once at the end, as most tournament models do, or also at some points
midway through, is a strategic decision of the mechanism designer. Moreover, once such an
option is considered, the first question that comes to mind is, how are the results of the differ-
ent reviews optimally aggregated into a ranking? This is the question we seek to address in
this paper.
Midway reviews are a common phenomenon in tournaments. Students compete to be
ranked high in their class, and the professor must choose whether to conduct a final exam
only, or final and midterm exams. If the latter is chosen, then a rule according to which the re-
sults of the two exams are aggregated into a rankingmust also be determined. Employees exert
effort in order to be promoted in organizational hierarchies. Periodical reviews are conducted
and these reviews are then aggregated to determine who will be promoted. The multi-round
tournaments employed in many branches of sports are an obvious example of determining the
winner by aggregating the results of a few rounds.
Our aim is to understand the role of reviews in providing incentives to exert efforts, and
not merely a tool in selecting the ablest agent among asymmetric ones. To this end we study
a simple two-stage two-agent tournament in which symmetric agents first choose their effort
level in stage one, and then the level of effort in stage two. A designer whose goal is to max-
imize the agents’ total effort has to decide whether to conduct only one final review after the
second stage, or two reviews: a midterm and a final. In the model studied here, the review
process is not perfect and can yield only an ordinal ranking that is positively, but only par-
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tially, correlated with the agents’ efforts. In particular, we assume that the probability of the
review resulting in agent i being ahead of agent j is increasing in the difference between their
respective efforts, and the probability of an inconclusive review, where a tie is announced, is
maximized when both agents exert the same effort level. While effort level invested in stage
two affects only the final review, the effort invested in stage one might affect the outcomes of
both reviews. This is captured by assuming that a discounted value of effort exerted in stage
one enters into the process according to which the outcome of the final review is determined
(where the discounting parameters can be anything between zero and one). Finally, we assume
that the outcome of the midterm review, if conducted, is public knowledge.
It is shown that conducting a midterm review has two opposite effects: it tends to increase
the agents’ effort level in stage one, but tends to decrease it in stage two. The latter occurs
when the midterm review results in one agent being ahead of the other. While we show that
it is always strictly optimal to conduct a midterm review, we also demonstrate that this is true
only when the results of both reviews are aggregated optimally. In particular, we show that
treating the two reviews symmetrically might result in an equilibrium effort level that is infe-
rior to the one in which only a final review is conducted. However, treating the two reviews
lexicographically by first looking at the final review, and using the midterm review only as a
tie-breaking rule, strictly dominates the option of conducting final review only. The optimal
mechanism falls somewhere in between these two extreme mechanisms, as our characteriza-
tion will show. In particular, we shall show that the more effective the first-stage effort is in
determining the final review’s outcome, the smaller is the weight that should be assigned to
the midterm review in determining the agents’ ranking.
Related Literature
Rosen (1986) , Gradstein and Konrad (1999) andMoldovanu and Sela (2006), among others,
studied a different version of multi-round tournament called the Elimination Tournament. In the
elimination tournament the agents are divided into groups and only the winner of each round
proceeds to the next round, in which he competes against the winners of other groups. The
goal is to design an optimal structure of prizes at every round and an optimal assignment of
contestants into groups.
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Meyer (1991) considers the situation where the manager can learn over several periods
about the workers’ abilities. However, at each period, the manager can observe only whether
one of the agents outperforms his opponent by some margin. The manager chooses these
margins in order to gain information on the workers’ abilities. In particular, it is shown that it
improves the manager’s information if the last period margin is chosen in favor of the current
leader. Our paper, in contrast, uses the result of the mid-term as a tool to increase the efforts
chosen by the participants.
A paper that is closer to ours is Aoyagi (2004), who studied a multi–stage two-agent tour-
nament. However’ unlike the case studied here, Aoyagi assumes a fixed mechanism, one in
which equal weights are assigned to all midway reviews. In an environment in which first-
stage effort is as effective as second-stage effort, relative to the final outcome, Aoyagi asked
and provided an answer to the question of when is it optimal to reveal to the participants in-
formation about the outcome of the midterm reviews. Ederer (2006) enriched the Aoyagi’s
model with agents that have different abilities. Yildirim (2005) studied a two-stage two-agent
contest in which agents observe each other effort in stage one before investing in stage two.
However, in his model there is only one review at the end. Yildirim analyzes the effect of the
asymmetric abilities on the equilibrium strategies of the players.
Dubey and Haimanko (2003) studied the effect of aggregating the results of reviews on the
incentives of the contestants. They assume that the principal samples a number of rounds and
the winner is the agent who wins the most rounds (among the sampled ones). They show that
as the number of rounds goes to infinity the proportion of stages that are sampled goes to zero.
This result is driven by sufficient differences in the contestants’ quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setup. In
Section 3 we study the equilibrium when the designer is restricted to conduct a final review
only. The equilibrium when midterm and final reviews are conducted is analyzed in Section 4,
and the optimal aggregation rule is then characterized in Section 5
4
2 Basic Setup
Two risk-neutral agents i = 1, 2 are asked to exert effort in two stages. Agent i′s effort in stage
t = 1, 2 is denoted by eti ∈ [0,∞) and is exerted at cost c : [0,∞) → R+. Effort eti is agent i’s
private information and is not observed by either the other agent or the principal. The prin-
cipal, however, whose goal is to maximize the expected sum of effort
∑
i
∑
t e
t
i, can influence
the agents’ decision by conducting reviews and rewarding the agents in a way that reflects the
reviews’ results. Reviews can take place either after stage one (hereafter the midterm review),
after stage two (the final review), or after both stages, and we assume throughout the paper
that the reviews’ results are public information.
We restrict our attention to the case in which there is a fixed prize of size one that has to
be allocated at the end of stage two. The prize might be promotion to a higher rank in the
corporation, or it might be thought of as the utility of a student from being ranked first in his
class. Thus, if agent i whose effort levels in the two stages are e1i and e
2
i , respectively, wins the
award in probability p, his expected payoff is p−∑t c(eti).
The review process is imprecise and yields only a noisy ranking of agents’ efforts. In par-
ticular, the outcome of a midterm review, if conducted, is determined by
Γ
(
e11, e
1
2
)
=
[
f1
(
e11 − e12
)
, f0
(
e11 − e12
)
, f2
(
e11 − e12
)]
where f1(·) is the probability that agent 1 comes out first in the review. Similarly f2(·) is the
probability that the second agent is shown to exert more effort, and f0(·) = 1− f1(·) − f2(·) is
the probability that the review is inconclusive and a tie is declared.1
Let τi = δe
1
i + e
2
i denote the effective total effort where δ ∈ [0, 1] captures the fact that the
effort in stage one is not as effective as the effort in stage two in determining the outcome of
the final review, which is similarly determined by
Γ
(
e11, e
1
2, e
2
1, e
2
2
)
= [f1 (τ1 − τ2) , f0 (τ1 − τ2) , f2 (τ1 − τ2)] .
1 The main results still hold if instead we define
Γ
(
e11, e
1
2
)
=
[
f1
(
e11
e12
)
, f0
(
e11
e12
)
, f2
(
e11
e12
)]
.
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We make the following assumptions on f(·) and c(·)
As: Symmetry: for all y ∈ (−∞,∞), f0 (y) = f0 (−y) , and f1 (y) = f2 (−y).
Ai: Information content
a. df1(x)
dx
> 0; df2(x)
dx
< 0; df0(x)
dx

> 0 if x < 0
= 0 if x = 0
< 0 if x > 0
,
b. limx→−∞ f1(x) = 0 and limx→∞ f1(x) = 1.
At: Γ is twice continuously differentiable.
Ac: c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0 and for any e ∈ [0,∞], c′′(e) > γ(Γ) > 0.2
Note that As expresses the symmetry between the two agents, while Ai captures the idea
that the review process is informative. More precisely, the probability of coming out first (sec-
ond) increases (decreases) in one’s own effort, while the probability of a tie is maximized when
both agents choose the same effort level. Assumptions At and Ac are mainly technical and
much more than what is needed to assure that second-order conditions for optimum are met
and that a symmetric equilibrium exists. In particular, the cost function c(·) must be convex
enough, so that its second derivative is always above some constant γ that in turn depends on
the shape of Γ.
The figure below illustrates the main features of Γ(·). In particular, note that f1(0) = f2(0) <
1/2 and that f0(·) reaches its maximum at 0.
Denote the output of the t′s review by st ∈ {0, 1, 2}. A review system, often called a mech-
anism, specifies how many reviews to conduct, when to conduct them, and how the different
st are then to be aggregated to yield an allocation rule. We restrict our attention to symmetric
mechanisms. In the following section we start by studying the mechanism where only one
review is conducted.
2 The precise form of γ(Γ) is defined in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: The main features of Γ(·).
3 Conducting Final Review Only
When only a final review is conducted, the set of symmetric mechanisms is characterized by
the probability β ∈ [0, 1] at which the prize is allocated to the agent who came out first in the
review. Thus, the expected utility of agent i whose effort levels in the two stages are e1i and e
2
i ,
and his opponent’s effort levels are e1j and e
2
j , and as defined above τl = δe
1
l + e
2
l for l = i, j, is
−c(e1i )− c(e2i ) + βfi (τ1 − τ2) +
1
2
f0 (τ1 − τ2) + (1− β)fj (τ1 − τ2) (1)
which by As can be written as
−c(e1i )− c(e2i ) + βf1 (τi − τj) +
1
2
f0 (τi − τj) + (1− β)f2 (τi − τj) .
The two first-order conditions with respect to e1i and e
2
i are given by
c′(e1i ) = δ
[
βf ′1 (τi − τj) +
1
2
f ′0 (τi − τj)+(1− β)f ′2 (τi − τj)
]
(2)
and
c′(e2i ) =
[
βf ′1 (τi − τj) +
1
2
f ′0 (τi − τj) + (1− β)f ′2 (τi − τj)
]
(3)
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First note that for β ≤ 1
2
the best response of each agent is to choose zero effort level in every
stage. Also recall from Assumption Ai that f ′0(0) = 0. Therefore, for any β >
1
2
, there exists a
symmetric solution to (2) and (3) where e11 = e
1
2 = eˆ
1 and e21 = e
2
2 = eˆ
2 for which
c′(eˆ1) = δ(2β − 1)f ′1 (0) (4)
c′(eˆ2) = (2β − 1)f ′1 (0)
From the assumed convexity of c(·) and the monotonicity of f1 it follows that a designer
whose goal is to maximize the agents’ efforts will set β = 1 which allows us to rewrite (4) as
c′(eˆ1) = δf ′1 (0) (5)
c′(eˆ2) = f ′1 (0) .
In the appendix we prove that second-order conditions for maximization are also satisfied.
Thus, the solutions to (5) determines the effort level in the symmetric equilibrium.
Remark 1. A second look at (4) reveals that the rule according to which the prize is allocated following a
tie has no effect on incentives. In particular, allocating the prize in some probability α ∈ [0, 1) when the
review is inconclusive will not change the effort level in equilibrium. This is a consequence of assumption
(Ai) that the probability of a tie is maximized when both agents choose the same effort level. Thus, a small
change in the effort level of any agent in either stage will not change the probability of a tie.
Remark 2. In our setup δ captures elements not under the principal’s control and elements under his
control. For example, δ might capture the fact that time spent early on studying toward the final is less
effective than time spent just before the final, which of course is not under the principal’s control. On
the other hand, by shifting more of the final weight to materials that are covered early on, the principal
can make the time invested early on more effective. Similarly, in a promotion decision in a corporation,
the committee in charge of promotion might be more affected by the latest achievements of the different
candidates. The designer might instruct the committee how to treat the candidates’ achievements in both
periods however, this recommendation may have only a partial effect. In light of this discussion, it is
instructive to note that, in equilibrium, total effort level eˆ1 + eˆ2 increases with the discount factor δ.
A corollary of this observation is that conducting only a final review dominates a mechanism in
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which only a midterm review is conducted. To see why, simply note that when only a midterm review
is conducted, second-stage effort has no effect on the allocation of the prize, and hence the effort levels
in equilibrium e¯1 and e¯2 are exactly the mirror image of the effort levels when only a final review is
conducted and δ = 0.
4 Conducting Midterm and Final Reviews
Recall that st ∈ {0, 1, 2} stands for the result of review t ∈ {1, 2} and let g(s1, s2) be the prob-
ability that the prize goes to agent 1 after the history (s1, s2). Because we are restricting our
attention to the symmetric mechanism it follows that
g(s1, s2) = 1− g(s′1, s′2)whenever s′i =

si if si = 0
2 if si = 1
1 if si = 2
.
Our interest lies in characterizing the optimal values of g(s1, s2). At the end of stage one a
midterm review is conducted and results either in a tie or in a winner. Now, although the effort
level of agent j in stage one is not revealed to agent i, in equilibrium agent i knows its value.
Thus, by abusing the language somewhat, we refer to the different continuations following
the midterm as subgames. With this in mind, let eLi (e
1
i ) be agent i
′s optimal effort level in the
subgame when he is the leader, after exerting e1i in stage one. Similarly, let u
L
i (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) denote
his expected utility in the subgame. Along the same line define eFi (e
1
i ), u
F
i (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i )) for the
subgame in which he is a follower and eTi (e
1
i ), u
T
1 (e
1
1, e
T
1 (e
1
1)) for the subgame following a tie.
Thus, the expected utility of agent i whose effort level in stage one is e1i , and whose oppo-
nent’s effort level is e1j can now be written as
−c(e1i ) + fi
(
e11 − e12
)
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) + f0
(
e11 − e12
)
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i ))
+fj
(
e11 − e12
)
uFi (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i ))
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Using As, it can be rewritten as
−c(e1i ) + f1
(
e1i − e1j
)
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) + f0
(
e1i − e1j
)
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i )) (6)
+f2
(
e1i − e1j
)
uFi (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i ))
In equilibrium, e1i , e
L
i (e
1
i ), e
F
i (e
1
i ), and e
T
i (e
1
i ) maximize agent i’s payoff given the strategy
of his rival, agent j, e1j , e
L
j (e
1
j ), e
F
j (e
1
j), and e
T
j (e
1
j ). The following lemma, which derives the
first-order condition of the agents’ maximization problem in a symmetric equilibrium, is in-
strumental in characterizing the optimal mechanism. The proof of it is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1. The effort levels e1, eT , and eL = eF = eLF are a solution to the first-order conditions if they
satisfy the following three equations:
c′(eT ) =
 f
′
1(0) (g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)) if g(0, 1)− g(0, 2) > 0
0 otherwise
(7)
c′(eLF ) =
 f
′
1 (0) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) if g(1, 1)− g(1, 2) > 0
0 otherwise
(8)
and
c′(e1) =
 f
′
1 (0)A if A > 0
0 otherwise
(9)
where
A = [2f1 (0) (g(1, 1) + g(1, 2)− 1) + f0 (0) (2g(1, 0)− 1)]
+2f1 (0) δ [g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)] + f0 (0) δ [g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)]
Proof. See Appendix.
Denote by e1(g(s1, s2)), e
LF (g(s1, s2)) and e
T (g(s1, s2)) the solutions to (9), (8) and (7). In the
appendix we establish that second-order conditions are satisfied. Thus, for every g(s1, s2), the
effort levels e1(g(s1, s2)), e
LF (g(s1, s2)), and e
T (g(s1, s2)) constitute a symmetric equilibrium. In
other words, e1(g(s1, s2)), e
LF (g(s1, s2)), and e
T (g(s1, s2)) define a global maximum for each
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agent, given that the other agent is doing the same. In Section 5 we derive the optimal alloca-
tion rule, g∗(s1, s2).
Remark 3. Note that the agents’ efforts in period two are not affected by how the prize is allocated after
a tie in the final, as can be seen from the absence of the term g(·, 0) in either (8) or (7). But unlike the
case where only final review is conducted, here g(·, 0) does have an effect on the agents’ incentives, and
in particular on the effort exerted in stage one as can be seen in 9. Consequently, when two reviews are
conducted, the allocation rule after a tie in the final must be chosen with care. However, the allocation
rule after ties in both reviews g(0, 0) has no effect on incentives (note that the term g(0, 0) does not
appear in (8), (7) or (9)).
Remark 4. One may wonder how it is that in a subgame in which there is a leader, both agents, the
leader and the follower, exert the same level of effort in equilibrium. The reason for this is rather simple:
winning in this subgame is worth the same for both. For the follower it increases the probability of
getting the prize by g(2, 1)− g(2, 2), while for the leader it increases the probability by g(1, 1)− g(1, 2).
In any symmetric mechanism these expressions are the same.
5 The Optimal Allocation Rule
The optimal allocation rule g∗(s1, s2) solves
g∗(s1, s2) = arg max
g(s1,s2)
[e1(g(s1, s2)) + 2f1(0)e
LF (g(s1, s2)) (10)
+(1− 2f1(0))eT (g(s1, s2))].
The following theorem follows immediately from the first-order conditions that were derived
in Lemma 1, and the monotonicity of f1 and c
′.
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Theorem 2. In the optimal symmetric allocation rule g∗(s1, s2),
g∗(1, 1) = 1− g∗(2, 2) = 1
g∗(1, 0) = 1− g∗(2, 0) = 1
g∗(0, 1) = 1− g∗(0, 2) = 1
g∗(0, 0) = 0.5
Proof. From (9) and (8) it follows that effort levels in stage one and in the subgame in which
there is a leader increase with g∗(1, 1). Because effort level in the subgame in which there is a
tie is not affected by g∗(1, 1),we conclude that in the optimal mechanism g∗(1, 1) = 1. Similarly,
g∗(0, 1) = 1 follows because effort levels in stage one and in the subgame in which there is a tie
increase with g∗(0, 1) (see (9) and (7)) while g∗(0, 1) does not have an effect on the effort level in
the subgame in which there is a leader (see (8)). Finally, note that g∗(1, 0) = 1 follows because
effort level in stage one increases with g∗(1, 0) (see (9)), but has no effect on the effort level in
stage two. g∗(0, 0) = 0.5 follows from the symmetry of the mechanism.
Theorem (2) characterizes all values of g∗(s1, s2) but g
∗(1, 2) = 1−g∗(2, 1),which turns out to
depend on the specific parameters of the problem (like c and Γ) and will be studied shortly. But
first note that all values of g∗(s1, s2) that are determined by the Theorem agree with the simple
and commonly used majority rule in which the two reviews are treated symmetrically. In the
majority rule, an agent is awarded (say) two points after winning a review, one point after a tie,
and zero otherwise, and the prize is awarded to the agent who collected more points in total.
One might rush to conclude that a natural candidate for g∗(1, 2) is half, the value assigned to
it by the majority rule. The following example demonstrates that choosing g∗(1, 2) = 0.5 is
often suboptimal and might even lead to an outcome that is inferior to the one obtained when
only final review is conducted.
Example: Assume that c(e) = exp(e)− e− 1, δ = 1, and f1(x) = 1√2pi
∫ x
−∞ exp(− (s−0.2)
2
2
)ds. It follows
that in this case
f ′1(x) =
1√
2π
exp
(
−(x− 0.2)
2
2
)
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and
f1(0) = 0.420 74
f ′1(0) = 0.391 04.
Consider first the one-review system in which only a final review is conducted. In this mechanism, the
first-order conditions yield e1 = e2 = e¯ where
c′(e) = f ′1(0).
It follows that in the one-review system, the effort level of each agent in each stage is e¯ = 0.330 05.
Now consider the two-review system with the majority rule gm(s1, s2) in which
gm(1, 1) = gm(1, 0) = gm(0, 1) = 1 and gm(1, 2) = gm(0, 0) = 0.5
is used. The solutions to the first-order conditions, e¯1, eT and eLF , are given by the system of equations
c′(eT ) = f ′1(0)
c′(eLF ) =
1
2
f ′1 (0)
c′(e1) = (1 + δ)f ′1 (0) (f1 (0) + f0 (0)) ,
which yields
e1 = 0.373 65, eLF = 0.178 58 and eT = 0.330 05.
Thus, the expected effort level is 0.57624, which is lower than 0.6601, the expected effort level when only
a final review is conducted. It can be verified that the second-order conditions are satisfied as well. ⊳
The main objective of the example above was to demonstrate that unless the allocation rule
is chosen carefully, one might end up with a mechanism that is inferior to the one in which
only one review is conduct. While the exact mechanism, and in particular the exact value of
g∗(1, 2), varies with the different parameters of the problem, the following lemma shows that a
two-review system, in which the midterm review is used only as a tie-breaking device for the
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final review, i.e., g(1, 2) = 0, although not always optimal, dominates the one-review system.
Lemma 3. If g(1, 2) = 0, then expected effort in the two-review system is higher than in the one-review
system. That is,
e1 + 2f1(1)e
LF + (1− 2f1(1))eT > eˆ1 + eˆ2.
Proof. Consider first the two-review system and note that when g(1, 2) = 0, then
eT = eLF = e¯2 where c′(e¯2) = f ′1 (0) ,
and the effort level in stage two is given by
c′(e1) = f ′1 (0) [f0 (0) + δ].
Next recall the equilibrium equation (5) for the one-review system, we conclude that (for all
f0 (0) > 0) e¯
2 = eˆ2 and e1 > eˆ1.
Note that the lower g(1, 2) is, the higher the incentives are to exert effort in the second
stage. However, lowering g(1, 2) decreases the incentives of the agents to exert effort in the
first stage because it decreases the weight assigned to a win in stage one. The optimal g(1, 2)
exactly balances this trade-off. The following theorem characterizes g∗(1, 2) and in particular
demonstrates that if c′′′ > 0 then g∗(1, 2) decreases as δ increases. In words, the more effective
the first stage-effort is in determining the outcome of the final review, i.e., the higher δ is, the
smaller is the weight that should be assigned to the midterm in determining the allocation
of the prize. The intuition behind this result is rather straightforward. When δ is small the
midterm review is the more effective tool to get the agents to exert effort in the first stage. But
assigning a high weight to the midterm review has an adverse effect on the second-stage effort.
Thus, when δ gets larger, first-stage effort has an effect on final review’s outcome, and agents
exert effort in stage one even when the weight that is assigned to the midterm review is very
low. Because decreasing the weight assigned to the midterm review increases the expected
effort in stage two, it is optimal to do so.
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Theorem 4. If c′′′(·) > 0, then
g∗(1, 2) =

2f1(0)
1+2f1(0)
if δ = 0
0 if δ = 1
.
Moreover, g∗(1, 2) decreases with δ.
Proof. Recall that g∗(1, 2) is chosen to maximize
TE(g(1, 2)) = e1(g(1, 2)) + 2f1(0)e
LF (g(1, 2)) + (1− 2f1(0))eT (g(1, 2)).
It follows from (7) that ∂e
T
∂g(1,2)
= 0 and hence
∂TE
∂g(1, 2)
=
∂e1
∂g(1, 2)
+ 2f1(0)
∂eLF
∂g(1, 2)
.
From (9)
∂e¯1
∂g(1, 2)
= −2f1 (0) f
′
1 (0) (1− δ)
−c′′(e1) > 0
and from (8)
∂eLF
∂g(1, 2)
= − −f
′
1 (0)
−c′′(eLF ) .
We get
∂TE
∂g(1, 2)
=
∂e¯1
∂g(1, 2)
+ 2f1 (0)
∂eLF
∂g(1, 2)
= 2f1 (0) f
′
1 (0)
[
1− δ
c′′(e1)
− 1
c′′(eLF )
]
. (11)
First note that the assumed c′′′(·) > 0 guarantees that ∂TE
∂g(1,2)
= 0 is a point of maximum. Now,
when δ = 0, ∂TE
∂g(1,2)
= 0 implies that e¯1 = eLF , which by plugging into (8) and (9) yields
g∗(1, 2) =
2f1(0)
1 + 2f1(0)
.
Next note that from (9) it follows that e¯1 increases with δ and with g(1, 2) while eLF decreases
with g(1, 2). It is now easy to see from (11) that g∗(1, 2) decreases with δ. Finally, observe that
when δ = 1, ∂TE
∂g(1,2)
< 0 for any g(1, 2), and we conclude that in this case g∗(1, 2) = 0.
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5.1 The economics behind the theorem
With the characterization of g∗(s1, s2) in hand, it is instructive to go back and study the effort
levels in the different mechanisms as derived by the first-order conditions (5), (9), (8), and (7).
Consider the effort level in stage twowhen only final review is conducted and compare it to the
level of effort after a midterm. While the effort is the same in both mechanisms if the midterm
review resulted in a tie, this is not the casewhenwe have a leader after a midterm. In particular,
the effort level in stage two when only final review is conducted is higher than the level in the
subgame when there is a leader. The reason for this reduction in effort is now clear. When only
final review is conducted, the stakes in the second stage are very high because the difference
between winning and losing is the difference between receiving the prize in probability one
and not receiving it (recall that in a symmetric equilibrium the agents exert the same effort
level in stage one). Hence the incentive to invest in stage two is high. This is not the case in a
subgame in which there is a leader, however. In particular, for agent one who is the leader the
difference between winning and losing is g∗(1, 1) − g∗(1, 2) ≤ 1 while if he is the follower it is
g∗(2, 1)− g∗(2, 2) ≤ 1.
Thus, the the cost of conducting a midterm is the reduction in effort in the second period.
The gain from conducting a midterm is the building of incentives to exert effort in stage one.
That is, the effort level in stage one is always higher when a midterm is conducted, and it
increases with the weight assigned to themidterm, i.e., with g∗(1, 2). It follows that the designer
in choosing g∗(1, 2) must balance between these two opposite effects of g∗(1, 2). Now, because
the effort level in stage onr is increasing with δ and because c′′′ > 0, it follows that g∗(1, 2)
decreases with δ. Indeed, it follows from (11) that when we have an interior solution for the
optimal mechanism, i.e., 0 < g∗(1, 2) < 1, the equality
c′′(e1) = c′′(eLF ) (1− δ) , (12)
must hold. In particular c′′′ > 0 implies that e1 ≤ eLF and that an increase in δmust be followed
by a decrease in g∗(1, 2). Once g∗(1, 2) becomes 0, any further increase in δ does not change
g(1, 2) and therefore increases e1. Hence, for δ close enough to 1, g(1, 2) = 0 and e1 > eLF .
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Concluding Remark
While we have restricted ourselves to the case of two reviews only, it is easy to see that the
qualitative results as well as the intuition developed here extend to the case of n reviews (with
the added cost of notations).
6 Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1. We are interested in showing that e1(g(s1, s2)), e
LF (g(s1, s2)), and e
T (g(s1, s2))
solve agent i’s first-order condition system of equations, when agent j’s effort levels are set
to e1(g(s1, s2)), e
LF (g(s1, s2)) and e
T (g(s1, s2)). We start by deriving the FOC in the subgames
following the midterm. Consider the subgame following a tie. First note that although the
midterm resulted in a tie, still the player that invested more in the first stage has an advantage
since it increases the probability of winning the final review. Let ∆T (i, j) = δe1i + e
T
i − δe1j − eTj ,
where eTj is the effort level of agent j in the subgame. Agent i’s expected utility when his effort
level is eTi is
−c(eTi ) + f1
(
∆T (i, j)
)
g(0, 1) + f0
(
∆T (i, j)
)
g(0, 0) + f2
(
∆T (i, j)
)
g(0, 2). (13)
Recall that f2(x) = 1− f1(x)− f0(x), and rewrite (13) as
−c(eTi ) + f1(∆T (i, j)) (g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)) + f0(∆T (i, j)) (g(0, 0)− g(0, 2)) + g(0, 2).
Agent i’s first-order condition is
c′(eTi ) =
[
f
′
1(∆
T (i, j)) (g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)) + f ′0(∆T (i, j)) (g(0, 0)− g(0, 2))
]
. (14)
Finally, note that if both agents exerted the same effort level in stage one then there exists a
symmetric solution eT1 = e
T
2 = e
T (g(s1, s2)) that solves the first-order condition (14) for both
agents for which
c′(eT ) = f ′1 (0) (g(0, 1)− g(0, 2))
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if g(0, 1)− g(0, 2) > 0, and eT = 0 otherwise, as we had to show. Before moving to the subgame
in which there is a leader, we note that the utility of agent i in this subgame is given by
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i )) = −c(eTi (e1i )) + f1
(
∆˜T (i, j)
)
(g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)) (15)
+f0
(
∆˜T (i, j)
)
(g(0, 0)− g(0, 2)) + g(0, 2)
where eTi (e
1
i ) is a solution of the first-order condition, and
∆˜T (i, j) = δe1i + e
T
i (e
1
i )− δe1j − eTj (e1j ).
We next consider the subgame in which there is a leader. Assume agent i came out first in
the midterm review and is now the leader. Using As, agent i’s expected utility in the subgame
when his effort level is eLi and his rival’s effort level is e
F
j is
−c(eLi ) + f1(∆L(i, j)) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) + f0(∆L(i, j)) (g(1, 0)− g(1, 2)) + g(1, 2)
where as before ∆L(i, j) = δe1i + e
L
i − δe1j − eFj .
The leader’s first-order condition is
c′(eLi ) = f
′
1(∆
L(i, j)) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) + f ′0(∆L(i, j)) (g(1, 0)− g(1, 2)) . (16)
Similarly, we can express the follower’s expected utility and the corresponding first-order con-
dition as
−c(eFj ) + f1(−∆L(i, j)) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) + f0(−∆L(i, j))(g(1, 1)− g(1, 0))
+(1− g(1, 1))
and
c′(eFj ) = f
′
1(−∆L(i, j)) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) + f ′0(−∆L(i, j))(g(1, 1)− g(1, 0)). (17)
As in the subgame following a tie, so here, if both players choose the same effort in stage one,
there exists a symmetric solution eL1 = e
F
2 = e
LF (g(s1, s2)) which solves the two first-order
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conditions (16) and (17) and satisfies
c′(eLF ) = f ′1 (0) (g(1, 1)− g(1, 2))
if g(1, 1)− g(1, 2) > 0 and eT = 0 otherwise, as stated in the lemma.
It follows that the utilities of the agents in the subgame are given by
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) = −c(eLi (e1i )) + f1
(
∆˜L(i, j)
)
[g(1, 1)− (g(1, 2)] (18)
+f0
(
∆˜L(i, j)
)
[g(1, 0)− (g(1, 2)] + g(1, 2)
and
uFj (e
1
j , e
F
j (e
1
j )) = −c(eFj (e1j )) + f1
(
−∆˜L(i, j)
)
[g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)] (19)
+f0
(
−∆˜L(i, j)
)
[g(1, 1)− g(1, 0)] + 1− g(1, 1)
where eLi (e
1
i ) and e
F
j (e
1
j ) are the solutions to the system of two corresponding first-order condi-
tions (16) and (17) and ∆˜L(i, j) = δe1i + e
L
i (e
1
i )− δe1j − eFj (e1j ).
Assuming now that agent i’s effort levels in the subgames are eLF (g(s1, s2)) and e
T (g(s1, s2)),
it is left for us to show that
c′(e1) =
f ′1 (0) [2f1 (0) (g(1, 1) + g(1, 2)− 1) + f0 (0) (2g(1, 0)− 1)]
+2f1 (0) δf
′
1 (0) [g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)]
+f0 (0) δf
′
1 (0) [g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)]
if the expression on the right-hand side of the previous equality is positive. Recall that agent
i’s expected utility in the mechanism is
−c(e1i ) + f1
(
e1i − e1j
)
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) + f0
(
e1i − e1j
)
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i ))
+f2
(
e1i − e1j
)
uFi (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i ))
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which yields the following first-order condition with respect to e1i :
c′(e1i ) = f
′
1
(
e1i − e1j
)
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )) + f1
(
e1i − e1j
) duLi (e1i , eLi (e1i ))
de11
(20)
+f ′0
(
e1i − e1j
)
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i )) + f0
(
e1i − e1j
) duTi (e1i , eTi (e1i ))
de11
+f ′2
(
e1i − e1j
)
uFi (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i )) + f2
(
e1i − e1j
) duFi (e1i , eFi (e1i ))
de11
.
Using f ′2 (x) = −f ′1 (x)− f ′0 (x) we can rewrite (20) as
c′(e1i ) = f
′
1
(
e1i − e1j
) [
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i ))− uFi (e1i , eFi (e1i ))
]
+f ′0
(
e1i − e1j
) [
uTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i ))− uFi (e1i , eFi (e1i ))
]
+ f1
(
e1i − e1j
) duLi (e1i , eLi (e1i ))
de11
+f0
(
e1i − e1j
) duTi (e1i , eTi (e1i ))
de11
+ f2
(
e1i − e1j
) duFi (e1i , eFi (e1i ))
de11
.
Next note that for Z ∈ {T, L, F} and for i = 1, 2,
duZi (e
1
i , e
Z
i (e
1
i ))
de1i
=
∂uZi (e
1
i , e
Z
i (e
1
i ))
∂e1i
+
∂uZi (e
1
i , e
Z
i (e
1
i ))
∂eZi (e
1
i ))
∂eZi (e
1
i ))
∂e1i
.
However, since eZi (e
1
i ))maximizes u
Z
i (e
1
i , e
Z
i (e
1
i )) for any e
1
i , we have
3
duLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i ))
de1i
= δ
[
f ′1
(
∆˜L(i, j)
)
(g(1, 1)− g(1, 2)) + f ′0
(
∆˜L(i, j)
)
(g(1, 0)− g(1, 2))
]
,
duFi (e
1
i , e
F
i (e
1
i ))
de1i
= δ
[
f ′1
(
−∆˜L(j, i)
)
(g(2, 1)− g(2, 2)) + f ′0
(
−∆˜L(j, i)
)
(g(2, 0)− g(2, 2))
]
,
and
duTi (e
1
i , e
T
i (e
1
i ))
de1i
= δ
[
f ′1
(
∆˜T (i, j)
)
(g(0, 1)− g(0, 2)) + f ′0
(
∆˜T (i, j)
)
(g(0, 0)− g(0, 2))
]
.
Now, if in every second-stage subgame both agents exert the same effort (i.e., eLF (g(s1, s2))
and eT (g(s1, s2))), then both agents have the same first-order conditions determining first-stage
3 Since eZi (e
1
i )) maximizes u
Z
i (e
1
i , e
Z
i (e
1
i )), either
∂uZ
i
(e1
i
,eZ
i
(e1
i
))
∂eZ
i
(e1
i
))
= 0 or eZi (e
1
i )) = 0. Therefore, the second term in
the last expression is 0.
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effort. It implies that there exists a solution to the first-order condition (20) in which both agents
choose the same effort in stage one. Hence, stage two’s first-order conditions are indeed given
by (7) and (8) and ∆˜Z(i, j) = 0 for Z ∈ {T, L, F}. Moreover, from (18) and (19) it follows that
uLi (e
1
i , e
L
i (e
1
i )− uFi (e1i , eFi (e1i ))
= f0 (1) [2g(1, 0)− g(1, 2)− g(1, 1)]− g(2, 2) + g(1, 2)
= f0 (1) [2g(1, 0)− 1] + 2f1 (1) [g(1, 2)− 1 + g(1, 1)].
Plugging the last expressions into (20) we get, using f ′1 (0) = −f ′2 (0) and f ′0 (0) = 0, the required
equality (9), as stated in the lemma. 
7 Appendix B. Second-Order Conditions
Lemma 5. Assume there exists λ > 0, such that for any x ∈ R the following holds:
f
′
1(x), f
′
0(x), |f ′′0 (x)| , |f ′′1 (x)| , |f ′′2 (x)| < λ.
If for any y ∈ R+
c′′(y) > 5δ2λ+ 5δλ2 + 3λ
then in the one-review system as well as the two-review system, the solution to the first-order conditions
solves the agent maximization problem. That is, the second-order conditions for maximization hold.
Before proving the statement of Lemma (5) we first show that increasing the effort level
after a tie in the first stage always increases the agent’s probability of winning the prize.
Claim 1: For any x ∈ R, f ′1(x) + 12f ′0(x) > 0.
Proof: Observe first that for x ≤ 0, the statement of the claim follows directly from Ai. Also
note that As implies that
f1(x) +
1
2
f0(x) + f1(−x) + 1
2
f0(−x) = 1.
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Differentiating with respect to x yields
f
′
1(x) +
1
2
f ′0(x) = f
′
1(−x) +
1
2
f ′0(−x)
which establishes the claim. 
We first prove the statement for the system in which only a final review is conducted.
Proof of Lemma 5 for the one-review system. Without loss of generality we restrict our
attention to agent 1. Denote by u1(e
1, e2) the expected utility of agent 1 in the second stage if
his effort levels are e1 and e2, while his opponent plays e1,e2. Note that
∂u1(e
1, e2)
∂e2
= −c′(e2) +
[
f ′1
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)+ 1
2
f ′0
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)] . (21)
Since c′(0) = 0, Claim 1 implies that c′(0) < f
′
1(x) +
1
2
f ′0(x) for any x ∈ R. Moreover, c′′ > 32λ ≥
f
′′
1 (x)+
1
2
f ′′0 (x) implies that for any e
1 there exists a unique positive solution to ∂u1(e
1,e2)
∂e2
= 0 that
maximizes u1(e
1, e2), and denote this solution by e2(e1). From the implicit function theorem it
follows that
de2(e1)
de1
= −δ f
′′
1 (δe
1 + e2 − δe1 − e2) + 1
2
f ′′0 (δe
1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)
−c′′(e2) + f ′′1 (δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2) + 12f ′′0 (δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)
.
Since c′′(e2) > 3λ ≥ 2 (f ′′1 (δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2) + 12f ′′0 (δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)), we can conclude that∣∣∣de2(e1)de1 ∣∣∣ < δ. Taking a derivative of agent 1’s expected utility with respect to e1 yields
−c′(e1) + ∂u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e1
+
∂u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e2
de2(e1)
de1
.
The second derivative with respect to e1 is given by
−c′′(e1) + ∂
2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂ (e1)2
+ 2
∂2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e2∂e1
de2(e1)
de1
+
∂u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e2
d2e2(e1)
d (e1)2
+
∂2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂ (e2)2
(
de2(e1)
de1
)2
.
In what follows we will show that the above expression is negative. Since e2(e1) maximizes
22
u1(e
1, e2), it is enough to show that
−c′′(e1) + ∂
2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂ (e1)2
+ 2
∂2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e2∂e1
de2(e1)
de1
< 0. (22)
Starting with the second term in (22), it follows from f ′′Z < λ for Z ∈ {0, 1} that
∂2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂ (e1)2
= δ2
(
f ′′1
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)+ 1
2
f ′′0
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)) ≤ 3
2
δ2λ.
The third term in (22)
∂2u1(e
1, e2(e1))
∂e2∂e1
de2(e1)
de1
= δ
(
f ′′1
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)+ 1
2
f ′′0
(
δe1 + e2 − δe1 − e2)) de2(e1)
de1
<
3
2
δ2λ
Since c′′ > 5δ2λ+ 5δλ2 + 3λ, we conclude that the second-order condition is satisfied. 
We are now ready to prove the statement of the lemma for the two-review system, in which
both midterm and final reviews are conducted.
Proof of Lemma 5 for the two-review system. As before we restrict our attention to agent
1 only. Assume that the agent’s opponent plays e¯1, e¯T and e¯LF . Then
∂uL(e1, eL)
∂eL
= −c′(eL)− f ′2(δe1 + eL − δe1 − e¯LF ) (1− g(1, 2)) (23)
∂uT (e1, eT )
∂eT
= −c′(eT ) + f ′1(δe1 + eT − δe1 − eT ) +
1
2
f ′0(δe
1 + eT − δe1 − eT )
∂uF (e1, eF )
∂eF
= −c′(eF ) + f ′1(δe1 + eF − δe1 − eLF ) (1− g(1, 2)) .
Proceeding along the same lines as above, since c′(0) = 0, we get that ∂u
Z(e1,0)
∂eZ
> 0 for any
Z ∈ {L, F, T}. As before, c′′ > 3
2
λ ≥ f ′′1 (x) + 12f ′′0 (x) implies that for any e1 there exists a unique
positive solution to ∂u
Z (e1,eZ)
∂eZ
= 0 that maximizes uZ(e1, eZ), which will be denoted by eZ(e1).
Similarly to the one-review system it can be shown that for any Z ∈ {L, F, T}
∣∣∣∣deZ(e1)de1
∣∣∣∣ < δ.
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Taking the derivative of agent 1’s expected utility with respect to e1 we obtain
−c′(e1) + f ′1
(
e1 − e1) uL(e1, eL(e1)) + f1 (e1 − e1) duL(e1, eL(e1))
de1
+f ′0
(
e1 − e1)uT (e1, eT (e1)) + f0 (e1 − e1) duT (e1, eT (e1))
de1
+f ′2
(
e1 − e1)uF (e1, eF (e1)) + f2 (e1 − e1) duF (e1, eF (e1))
de1
where
duZ(e1, eZ(e1))
de1
=
∂uZ(e1, eZ(e1))
∂e1
+
∂uZ(e1, eZ(e1))
∂eZ1
deZ(e1)
de1
.
The second derivative is
−c′′(e1) + f ′′1
(
e1 − e1) uL(e1, eL(e1)) + f ′′0 (e1 − e1)uT (e1, eT (e1)) (24)
+f ′′2
(
e1 − e1)uF (e1, eF (e1)) + 2f ′1 (e1 − e1) duL(e1, eL(e1))de1
+2f ′0
(
e1 − e1) duT (e1, eT (e1))
de1
+ 2f ′2
(
e1 − e1) duF (e1, eF (e1))
de1
+f1
(
e1 − e1) d2uL(e1, eL(e1))
d (e1)2
+ f0
(
e1 − e1) d2uT (e1, eT (e1))
d (e1)2
+f2
(
e1 − e1) d2uF (e1, eF (e1))
d (e1)2
In what follows we will show that for any strategy (e1,eT , eLF ) of agent two, the expression in
(24) is always negative.
First note that
d2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
d (e1)2
=
∂2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂ (e1)2
+ 2
∂2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂e1∂eZ1
deZ1 (e
1)
de1
+
∂uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂eZ1
d2eZ1 (e
1)
d (e1)2
+
∂2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂ (eZ1 )
2
(
deZ1 (e
1)
de1
)2
.
However, since for any e1, eZ1 maximizes u
Z(e1, eZ1 (e
1)), we have that
d2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
d (e1)2
<
∂2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂ (e1)2
+ 2
∂2uZ(e1, eZ1 (e
1))
∂e1∂eZ1
deZ1 (e
1)
de1
. (25)
Next note that uZ(e1, eZ(e1)) ∈ [0, 1], for any Z ∈ {L, F, T}, because non-negative utility at any
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subgame is guaranteed by eZ1 = 0 and since the prize is 1, the utility cannot be higher than 1.
Therefore,
f ′′1
(
e1 − e1)uL(e1, eL(e1)) + f ′′0 (e1 − e1)uT (e1, eT (e1)) (26)
+f ′′2
(
e1 − e1)uF (e1, eF (e1))
< max
{
f ′′1
(
e1 − e1) , 0}+max{f ′′0 (e1 − e1) , 0}+max{f ′′2 (e1 − e1) , 0} ≤ 3λ.
Recall that
duZ(e1, eZ(e1))
de1
=
∂uZ(e1, eZ(e1))
∂e1
+
∂uZ(e1, eZ(e1))
∂eZ1
deZ(e1)
de1
=
∂uZ(e1, eZ(e1))
∂e1
where the last equality follows from the envelope theorem. Therefore,
duL(e1, eL(e1))
de1
= δ
(−f ′2 (δe1 + eL − δe1 − eLF)) (1− g(1, 2))
duT (e1, eT (e1))
de1
= δ
[
f
′
1(δe
1 + eT − δe1 − eT ) + 1
2
f ′0(δe
1 + eT − δe1 − eT )
]
duF (e1, eF (e1))
de1
= δ
[
f ′1(δe
1 + eF − δe1 − eLF ) (1− g(1, 2))] .
Since f ′2 < 0, we can conclude that
2f ′1
(
e1 − e1) duL(e1, eL(e1))
de1
+ 2f ′0
(
e1 − e1) duT (e1, eT (e1))
de1
(27)
+2f ′2
(
e1 − e1) duF (e1, eF (e1))
de1
≤ 2δλ2 + 3δλ2 = 5δλ2.
From (25) it follows that
d2uL(e1, eL1 (e
1))
d (e1)2
<
(
−δ2 − 2δde
L
1 (e
1)
de1
)
f ′′2
(
δe1 + eL − δe1 − eLF ) (1− g(1, 2))
< 3δ2
∣∣f ′′2 (δe1 + eL − δe1 − eLF)∣∣ < 3δ2λ.
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Similarly, we get that
d2uT (e1, eT1 (e
1))
d (e1)2
<
(
δ2 + 2δ
deT1 (e
1)
de1
)(
f
′′
1 (δe
1 + eT − δe1 − eT ) + 1
2
f ′′0 (δe
1 + eT − δe1 − eT )
)
< 3δ2
(∣∣∣f ′′1 (δe1 + eT − δe1 − eT )∣∣∣ + 12 ∣∣f ′′0 (δe1 + eT − δe1 − eT )∣∣
)
< 3δ2
3
2
λ
and
d2uF (e1, eF1 (e
1))
d (e1)2
<
(
δ2 + 2δ
deF1 (e
1)
de1
)
(1− g(1, 2)) f ′′1 (δe1 + eF − δe1 − eLF )
< 3δ2
∣∣f ′′1 (δe1 + eF − δe1 − eLF )∣∣ < 3δ2λ.
Therefore,
f1
(
e1 − e1) d2uL(e1, eL1 (e1))
d (e1)2
+ f0
(
e1 − e1) d2uT (e1, eT1 (e1))
d (e1)2
(28)
+f2
(
e1 − e1) d2uF (e1, eF1 (e1))
d (e1)2
≤ 3δ23
2
λ.
In sum, since the second line in (24) is less than 3λ, the third line is less than 5δλ2, and the last
line is less than 3δ2 3
2
λ, it follows that if
c′′ > 5δ2λ+ 5δλ2 + 3λ,
then the second-order condition is satisfied. 
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